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Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential
Logic of Late Capitalism:*
A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Rise and
Diffusion of Law and Economics
ERIC M. FINKt
INTRODUCTION
Socio-legal scholarship's distinctive contribution consists in offering
a constitutive theory of law in society.' This theory posits that law is nei-
ther autonomous of,' determined by,' nor determinative of' society.
Rather, law and society are mutually enmeshed in an ongoing process of
structuration,5 in which social action-by individuals and groups-
* Cf. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991).
t Attorney at Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. J.D., New
York University School of Law, 1997; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 1985; B.A., Johns Hop-
kins, 1984.
I. See John Brigham, Rights, Rage, and Remedy: Forms of Law in Political Discourse, 2 STUD.
AM. POL. DEv. 303,304 (1987).
2. Examples of legal theories positing the radical autonomy of law from society are legal positiv-
ism, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW I8I-82 (I96I), and autopoiesis theory, see ROGER
COTrERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 65-70 (2d ed. 1992).
3. Social determinist theories of law include the economic determinism associated with Marx,
see, e.g., KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1970), as well as those
versions of Law and Economics that posit a structural/evolutionary tendency toward efficiency in the
law. See Lewis Kornhauser, L'Analyse Economique du Droit [Economic Analysis of Law], 16 MATERI-
ALl PER UNA STORIA DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA 233, 244-45 (1986) (discussing evolutionary claim of
Law and Economics).
4. Instrumentalist theories portray law as structuring social action and institutions, but fail to
explain why law is able to do so, and ignore the power of social forces in driving law to do so. See, e.g.,
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES 33 (1956); COTTERELL, supra note 2, at 135 (discussing versions of Marxist analysis that locate
law within the determinative economic base); Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 237-38 (discussing instru-
mentalist claim of Law and Economics). For a socio-legal critique of instrumentalist theories, see gen-
erally Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 187o-
192o, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
5. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (1984). Giddens uses the term
"structuration" to describe the mutual constitution of social structure and human agency. Id. at 281-
84. For a brief explanation of structuration theory, see What are the Central Concepts of Structuration
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simultaneously plays out within and (re)produces a structured social ter-
rain. In the socio-legal imagination, law is "a generative force of our pub-
lic life," it is "both agent and object.
' 6
One problem that is ripe for socio-legal inquiry is the emergence and
diffusion of the Law and Economics movement.7 A socio-legal approach
would consider Law and Economics not simply as a style of legal analysis
or a school of thought within law, but as a discursive project, constituted
by and constitutive of an emergent socio-legal matrix. That approach
would be attentive not only to the instrumental significance of Law and
Economics, but also what difference, if any, Law and Economics makes
in deciding legal cases; who employs and benefits from Law and Eco-
nomics; and similar concerns. This approach would additionally be par-
ticularly attentive to its constitutive significance for socio-legal praxis-
how Law and Economics frames meaning and action across the multiplic-
ity of socio-legal fields. In order to more closely examine this breadth,
this Article represents an attempt to sketch the outlines of a socio-legal
analysis of Law and Economics, and to suggest some starting points for
socio-legal research into the Law and Economics movement.
I. LAW AND ECONOMICS AND ITS DISCONTENTS
The Law and Economics movement comprises
a diverse group of legal scholars who are cognizant of each other's
writings, and who at a minimum share the view that the principles of
neoclassical economic analysis -particularly the principles of price and
allocation theory that rest upon the concepts of methodological indi-
vidualism, rational maximization, and marginalism-can fruitfully be
applied to aid in understanding and evaluating the operation of legal
rules and institutions.8
Theory?, London School of Economics and Political Science, at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Giddens/FAQs
.htm#StructQ2 (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
6. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1986). Fiss's formulation,
however, retains a subject-object dualism that socio-legal theory abjures.
7. Both proponents and critics have identified Law and Economics as the most "significant" and
"influential" movement in contemporary legal scholarship. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Values and
Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law 2 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin
Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 53, 2d Series, 1998), at http://www.law
.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs-51-75/53.Posner.Values.pdf ("Economic analysis of law is gener-
ally considered the most significant development in legal thought in the United States since legal real-
ism petered out a half century ago."): Anthony T. Kronman, The Second Driker Forum for Excellence
in the Law, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 16o (1995) ("The law and economics movement.., today continues
and remains the single most influential jurisprudential school in this country.").
8. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting
the Problems of Nonfalisifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 231 n.2 (1991).
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While economic theory has long informed legal analysis,9 the Law
and Economics movement as such is a more recent phenomenon. Gen-
eral consensus dates the origin of the movement to the 196o publication
of a germinal article by Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost.'"
A. CLAIMS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Proponents maintain that Law and Economics is positivist in its
analysis," and portray it as a non-political, value-free scientific ap-
proach.'2 Law and Economics practitioners typically eschew considera-
9. See Randal C. Picker, Law and Economics: Intellectual Arbitrage, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 127,
128 (993) (locating the roots of Law and Economics at the University of Chicago in the 1930s).
io. 3 J.L. & ECON. I (i96o). The Journal of Law and Economics, in which Coase's article ap-
peared, had been launched at the University of Chicago Law School two years earlier. See I J.L. &
ECoN. (1958). For examples of work identifying Coase's article as the genesis of modem Law and
Economics, see Posner, supra note 7, at 2; Picker, supra note 9, at 128; Morton J. Horwitz, Law and
Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 905, 906 (I980); RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETI-
TION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 237 (1996); Neil Duxbury, Is There a
Dissenting Tradition in Law and Economics?, 54 Moo. L. REV. 300,300 (i99o); Lewis Kornhauser, The
New Economic Analysis of Law: Legal Rules as Incentives, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (Nicholas Mur-
curo ed., 1989); Nan Aron et al., Economics, Academia, and Corporate Money in America: The 'Law
and Economics' Movement, 24(4) ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 27, 27 (1992-1993).
A second article that is frequently credited as a progenitor of the modem Law and Economics
movement is Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Destruction and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961). See, e.g., Duxbury, supra note Io, at 300; Kornhauser, supra note Io, at 27; Aron et al., su-
pra note 1o, at 27. Also significant in bringing early attention to Law and Economics was a 1963 article
on antitrust policy by Robert Bork and Ward Bowman in Fortune magazine. See PERITZ, supra note
Io, at 236.
Notwithstanding the appearance of "isolated but seminal articles," including Coase's, in the 1950s
and i96os, at least one Law and Economics scholar locates the birth and development of the move-
ment in the 1970s. Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Economics: Settled Issues and Open Questions, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS 201 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
ii. See PERITZ, supra note so, at 238. "The positive claim that the consequences of a given legal
rule can be fruitfully examined using microeconomic theory," according to one Law and Economics
scholar, is "the only claim that would win widespread acceptance among law and economics scholars."
Ulen, supra note so, at 210. See also Posner, supra note 7, at 2 (identifying "positive" Law and Eco-
nomics as effort to "explain and predict the behavior of participants in and persons regulated by the
law" on basis of economic analysis).
12. See, e.g., Roger LeRoy Miller, Where Joe Bain, Mike Scherer, and Fritz Mueller 'Went Wrong':
A Libertarian View, 14(2) ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 15, 26 (1982) ("Economics is not going to
change people's values because it's a value-free science."); Editors, Foreword: Antitrust Law and Eco-
nomics at the University of Miami, 14(2) ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (characterizing "'pure'
microeconomics" as "a set of value-free analytical tools," and maintaining that "attempting to present
'the other side' would make no more sense.., than requiring professors of chemistry and physics to
give students 2 'versions' of those demanding sciences"); Ulen, supra note IO, at 21o (arguing that
"there is nothing value-laden" in the positive claim for microeconomic analysis in law and that this
claim "would win widespread acceptance among any legal scholar, adherent of [L]aw and [Elconomics
or not"); Posner. supra note 7, at 15 (asserting that "economics is pretty value-neutral, or at least as-
pires to be value neutral" and suggesting that Law and Economics analysis may favor "liberal" as well
as "conservative" policies); see also PERrrz, supra note io, at 238-41 (discussing the Law and Econom-
ics movement's claim to be non-political in contradistinction to distributional claims); Horwitz, supra
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tion of distributional claims, consigning those to the political realm.' 3
They insist that the movement's influence is methodological, articulating
formal theoretical models of legal phenomena resting on explicit behav-
ioral and factual assumptions derived from economic theory.'4
Three premises underlie Law and Economics argument: that rational
individuals pursue preference-maximizing actions and exchanges;'5 that
rules of law impose prices on (or subsidize) individual action, such that
those rules alter the nature and amount of activity;'6 and that common
law rules are efficient (in a Pareto'7 or Kaldor-Hicks' s sense), in that they
reach the results that rational actors would reach through a process of
free exchange."
On the basis of these premises, advocates of Law and Economics
contend that efforts to regulate individual behavior through the law are
likely to be futile or have perverse or dangerous consequences.0 The ar-
gument against regulation is twofold: first, the costs (anticipated and un-
anticipated) of regulation often outweigh its benefits;' second, regulation
is a form of rent-seeking behavior by cartelizing groups seeking to gain a
note 1o, at 95o (criticizing the movement's "effort to create a system of legal thought that is objective,
neutral and apolitical," claiming the mantle of science).
13. See PERrrz, supra note Io, at 238-41; Horwitz, supra note io, at 9io.
14. Charles Goetz, The Courtship of Law and Economics, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 245, 249 (1989).
15. Richard Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, AM. ECON. REV., May 1987, at I, 5;
Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 818-20 (1989); Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 234; Carl T. Bogus, War on the
Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 5, 23 (995); Mark
Tushnet, Idols of the Right: The "Law and Economics" Movement, DISSENT, Fall 1993, at 475.
16. Posner, supra note 15, at 5.
17. Pareto efficiency describes a distribution in which no person can be made better off without at
least one other person being made worse off. See Cooter, supra note 15, at 82o-21; Kornhauser, supra
note 3, at 240-41; A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1989).
Polinsky's book provides an accessible guide to the basic concepts, premises, and application of Law
and Economics analysis. Id.
i8. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which addresses perceived limitations in Pareto efficiency, holds a
distribution efficient if the surplus redistributed to the winners is sufficient to compensate the losers
fully, even though no actual compensation need take place. See Cooter, supra note I5, at 827-29;
Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 241.
19. Posner, supra note 15, at 5; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 492-96
(1988).
20. Cf. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY
(1995). See, for example, Bogus, supra note I5, at 29 and Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A
Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.
REV. I99 (1988), discussing and critiquing examples of Law and Economics arguments that employ the
various prongs of Hirschman's rhetorical triad.
2i. Richard Epstein, for example, argues that strict liability encourages increased risk-taking by
consumers, and is therefore more costly and less efficient than a fault-based system. Richard A. Ep-
stein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 653, 664-69 (1985); see also
Bogus, supra note 15, at 26-28.
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premium over the market price for their activity." Legal intervention in
private interaction is justifiable only when it restores a dysfunctional
market to efficiency and facilitates free individual exchange."
Law and Economics does not limit its analysis to areas of law that
are most obviously economic in nature, such as antitrust, bankruptcy or
taxation. 4 Rather, like other forms of "economic imperialism,"25 Law and
Economics extends its reach into criminal law, torts, family law, constitu-
tional law, environmental law, jurisprudence, and the legal process, to
name but a few.26 For traditional legal scholars, who often assume that
the application of market logic outside the formal economic realm is lim-
ited or inappropriate, the imperialism of Law and Economics is often es-
pecially troubling. Yet advocates of Law and Economics denounce, as
untested and ill-founded, the assumption that market reasoning has little
applicability outside the economic realm2 The decision whether to apply
market analysis and commodity valuation, they assert, should rest on a
dispassionate assessment of the benefits and costs of doing so in a par-
ticular case.29
22. See Kelman, supra note 20, at 236-38.
23. See PERITZ, supra note IO, at 258-62; Duxbury, supra note Io, at 3o9-Io; Bogus, supra note 15,
at I8. For Law and Economics scholars of the Chicago School, the argument against legal regulation of
or interference with private interaction arises out of the conception of "wealth maximization" and
"freedom of contract" as the fulfillment of liberty and personal autonomy. PERiTz, supra note 1o, at
238-39 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 116-33 (1978), and RICHARD POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976)). See also Bogus, supra note 15, at 18 n.66 (discussing
Posner's endorsement of products liability doctrine as an "efficient mechanism for transmitting infor-
mation... from manufacturers to consumers").
24. Posner, supra note I5, at 4-5; Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (noting influence of Law and Eco-
nomics on "antitrust, the regulation of public utilities and common carriers, environmental regulation,
the computation of damages in personal injury suits, the regulation of the securities markets, the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines, the division of property and the calculation of alimony in divorce cases, and
the law governing investment by pension funds and other trustees").
25. "Economic imperialism" refers to the "practice of extending the domain of economic expla-
nation to all spheres of human activity." Kelman, supra note 20, at 206; see also Nicholas Mercuro,
Toward a Comparative Institutional Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, in LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS 17 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989). Mercuro and Kelman both cite GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976), as the exemplar of economic imperialism.
26. Posner, supra note 15, at 4-5.
27. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 15, at 18 (criticizing Law and Economics for its "unbounded faith
in the market").
28. Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets & Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 657, 662-63. Duxbury insists that
even the most imperialistic legal economists, such as Posner, do recognize limits to market reasoning.
Id. at 662.
29. Id. at 700-01. Duxbury appears not to recognize the arguable circularity of justifying the Law
and Economics approach in terms of economic analysis. The employment of economic analysis to ex-




Within the Law and Economics movement there are various tenden-
cies or strains that differ with respect to their claims and methodology.
First, it is possible to distinguish four distinct claims in Law and Econom-
ics scholarship:3" the behavioral claim holds that microeconomic analysis
can predict how individual actors will respond to different legal rules;3
the normative claim asserts that considerations of efficiency ought to de-
termine legal regimes;32 the descriptive claim suggests that "common
law... legal rules in fact induce efficient behavior";33 and the evolution-
ary claim identifies social forces as the driving mechanism behind law's
tendency toward efficiency.34 In addition, as the movement has devel-
oped, alternative forms of Law and Economics have emerged, which de-
part in various ways from the premises or methodology of the Chicago
School.3"
Notwithstanding these differences in argument and approach, it re-
mains meaningful to speak of a Law and Economics movement, albeit
not as an hypostatized, coherent and discrete corpus. Instrumentally, the
divergences within Law and Economics are significant; different versions
of Law and Economics may hold different implications and yield diver-
gent conclusions with respect to any given legal question. 6 Law and Eco-
30. See Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 237; see also Fiss, supra note 6, at 2-8 (distinguishing positive
or descriptive welfare economics arguments and normative libertarian economic arguments); Bogus,
supra note 15, at 17 n.6o (citing Anthony Kronman's distinction between positive/descriptive and
normative arguments in Law and Economics).
31. See Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 237-38. Within the behavioral claim is an instrumentalist
sub-claim, which takes account of the power of law to shape the preferences and incentive structures
that drive individual behavior according to microeconomic models. Id. at 239.
32. Id. at 240-42. Two prominent statements from outside law of the normative claim for neo-
classical economics are F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944), and MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM (1962); see also PETER L. BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: Fwrv PROPOSITIONS
ABOUT PROSPERITY, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY (1986). Posner identifies "normative" Law and Economics
as scholarship that "tries to improve law by pointing out respects in which existing or proposed laws
have unintended or undesirable consequences, whether on economic efficiency, or the distribution of
income and wealth, or other values." Posner, supra note 7, at 3.
33. See Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 243-44.
34. See id. at 244-45.
35. See Duxbury, supra note Io, at 302-05. Of particular significance has been work drawing on
the neo-institutionalist and public choice schools. See generally Symposium, Post-Chicago Law and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1989); Introduction to Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Sym-
posium, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 195-96 (1989); LAW AND ECONOMICS (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
36. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis
in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 73, 100-02 (suggesting the "practical indeterminacy" of eco-
nomic analysis in application to particular legal cases); Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 237-46 (discussing
the logical independence and varying implications of four Law and Economics claims).
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nomics in any form is nonetheless constitutive of neo-Libera 37 ideology
to the extent that it reproduces economistic discourse. 8
B. CRITIQUES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Law and Economics has been subject to considerable critique, from
both proponents and opponents of the movement. There have been two
principle lines of critique: challenges to the foundations of economic
analysis, and criticism of the ideological nature and implications of
economistic legal theory.39
Celebrating the "Courtship of Law and Economics," Charles Goetz
observed that "acceptance of a model must rest largely on pragmatic
ground: How well does the model work?"'4 It is not surprising then that
both critics of and adherents to Law and Economics have given consid-
erable attention to the practical weaknesses in its model. An early state-
ment of the foundational challenge from within the ranks of Law and
Economics is Arthur Leff's critical review of a leading Law and Econom-
ics treatise, Richard Posner's The Economic Analysis of Law." Leff
sharply questioned the view of homo economicus on which Posner's
analysis relied, and argued for a richer model of human behavior drawing
on psychology and sociology.
Subsequent assessments of Law and Economics echo and extend
Leff's critique. Along with finding the microeconomic model inadequate
or questionable as a depiction of human behavior,43 critics have observed
37. "Neo-Liberalism" refers to the resurgent "free-market," contractarian ideology that has been
hegemonic in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, reminiscent of-though not identical
to-that which characterized the hegemonic Liberal ideology of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries. See generally Gordon, supra note 4.
38. Even work critical of Law and Economics may be indicative of-and contribute to-its he-
gemony, to the extent that it is Law and Economics that the critics are criticizing (rather than safely
ignoring it). See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study 7 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working
Paper No. 9, 2d Series, L992), at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs-oi-25/o9.wml-rap
.econ.pdf ("Scholars rarely bother to criticize work that they don't think is or is likely to become influ-
ential. They ignore it.").
39. Mercuro, supra note 25, at 17-20 (identifying two predominant criticisms of Law and Eco-
nomics: inappropriateness of microeconomic assumptions and narrowness of efficiency concern).
40. Goetz, supra note 14, at 250.
41. Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV.
451 (1974) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973)).
42. Id. at 462-77. For another early critique of the analytical assumptions of Posnerian Law and
Economics, also from a scholar within the movement, see generally A. Mitchell Polinsky, Law and
Economics as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 20, at 202-03. For example, the assumptions of rational and in-
formed consumers have been challenged with respect to goods that are inherently dangerous to use
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that Law and Economics models ignore or distort the nature of legal and
social institutions and their implications for human behavior.' In addi-
tion, critics challenge the positivist claim of Law and Economics, main-
taining that empirical research fails to bear out the theoretical hypothe-
ses that the microeconomic model begets.45 As Goetz feared, such critics
are apt to conclude that Law and Economics is of little value to practical
legal concerns. 6
Partly in response to such criticism, some Law and Economics schol-
ars have embraced Leff's call for an enriched foundational model. Some
neo-institutionalist47 Law and Economics scholars in particular have
urged that the movement draw on insights from other disciplines such as
(e.g., cigarettes), unlikely to provide satisfaction (e.g., lottery tickets), or difficult to assess (e.g., auto-
mobile safety). Bogus, supra note 15, at 23-25, 27-38.
44. Kelman alleges that Law and Economics scholars offer a "distorted" description of institu-
tions such as common law rules. Kelman, supra note 20, at 202-04. Bogus argues that "moral hazard"
arguments against strict products liability inaccurately portray human response to legal rules, and that
the bargaining model of interaction ignores the force of social context and institutions such as em-
ployment relations, which constrain individual choice and voluntary assumption of risk. Bogus, supra
note 15, at 27-29.
Scholars in other disciplines, notably sociology and anthropology, have offered strong theoretical
and empirical challenges to the microeconomic model on this ground. Mark Granovetter, for example,
offers a theory of the social embeddedness of economic action in reply to the arguments of Coasean
transaction cost economists. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481, 481-83 (1985); see also Immanuel Wallerstein, Capitalist Mar-
kets: Theory and Reality, 30 Soc. ScI. INFO. 371 (I99t) (arguing that the market model in neo-classical
economic theory does not reflect historical economic practice); Paul Hirsch et al., "Dirty Hands" Ver-
sus "Clean Models": Is Sociology in Danger of Being Seduced by Economics?, 16 THEORY & SOC'Y 317
(1987).
For examples of empirical studies in sociology and anthropology that demonstrate the signifi-
cance of interpersonal relations and social structure to even archetypal market behavior, see generally
Wayne E. Baker, Market Networks and Corporate Behavior, 96 AM. J. Soc. 589 (i99o); Wayne E.
Baker, The Social Structure of a National Securities Market, 89 AM. J. Soc. 775 (1984); Cecilia For-
michella & J. Stephen Thomas, Rational Exchange and Trust: Business Relationships in a Fishing
Community, 9 Soc. SPECTRUM 259 (i989); Stuart Plattner, Economic Decision Making of Marketplace
Merchants: An Ethnographic Model, 43 HuM. ORG. 43 (1984); Stuart Plattner, Economic Custom in a
Competitive Marketplace, 85 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 848 (1983).
45. Kelman reviews work within the public choice school of Law and Economics and finds that
empirical investigation does not support the predictions of perversity or futility of government regula-
tion. Kelman, supra note 20, at 237-38. Likewise, Bogus insists that empirical reality does not support
the claim that strict products liability entails jeopardy in the form of more reckless consumer choice
and behavior. Bogus, supra note 15, at 27-28.
46. See Bogus, supra note 15, at 29.
47. "Neo-institutionalist" economics focuses on the significance of institutions in directing eco-
nomic behavior and outcomes. See generally EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND
ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2001); THRAINN
EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1990).
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sociology and psychology to augment or refine their microeconomic as-
sumptions."5
Other critiques of Law and Economics challenge the movement's
ideology, which the critics perceive as destructive of law. For these crit-
ics, Law and Economics "distort[s] the purposes of law and threaten[s] its
very existence."" The ideological objection to Law and Economics is
twofold, taking issue with its economic imperialism and with its concep-
tion of value.
The first aspect of the ideological objection to Law and Economics is
a variety of what sociologist Viviana Zelizer terms the "boundless mar-
ket" critique."0 This critique "centers on the destructive social, moral, and
cultural effects of commoditization" as the market model extends beyond
the scope of the economy itself.5 ' The "boundless market" critique does
not necessarily reject the premises of microeconomic theory. Rather, it
focuses on the (usually unacceptable) social outcomes as the market
paradigm spreads out from the economic realm to govern social relations
as a whole.52
The economic imperialism of Law and Economics asserts two claims
that trouble "boundless market" critics. On the one hand, under the in-
fluence of Law and Economics and related movements, "the political
sphere has come to be identified as an economic domain."53 On the other
hand, Law and Economics scholars "contrast the beneficent market with
the corrupt democratic state." 4 Turning the first of these claims against
the second, Mark Kelman argues that the flaws that Law and Economics
scholars identify in action by the democratic state in fact reflect the
state's embeddedness in and subordination to "the acquisitive capitalist
culture they extol."55 He contends that, rather than representing a scien-
48. See generally Ulen, supra note to; Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).
49. Fiss, supra note 6, at I.
50. Viviana A. Zelizer, Beyond the Polemics on the Market: Establishing a Theoretical and Em-
pirical Agenda, 3 Soc. F. 614, 618 (1988).
51. Id.
52. Id. A leading critical work in the "boundless market" tradition is KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION (957). Polanyi's thesis is that modem market exchange is radically cut off from ex-
isting social relations with the result that "[i]nstead of economy being embedded in social relations,
social relations are embedded in the economic system." Id. at 57; see also PIERRE BOURDIEU, FIRING
BACK (Loic Wacquant trans., The New Press 2003) (2001); PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTENCE
(Richard Nice trans., The New Press 1999) (1998); ENZO MINGIONE, FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES (Paul
Goodnick trans., I991); ANDRE GORZ, CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC REASON (Gillian Hordyside & Chris
Turner trans., 1989); Bernard Barber, The Absolutization of the Market, in MARKETS AND MORALS (Ge-
rald Dworkin et al. eds., 1977).
53. PERITZ, supra note to, at 302.




tific extension of value-free economic analysis to law, Law and Econom-
ics "is, in the deepest sense, partly about particular views of family life,
childrearing, ambivalence, ambition, asceticism, irony, the meaning of
time, learning, leisure, and love." 6 Yet these views do not follow logically
from the premises of economic argument; rather, they are "cultural," an
outcome of the worldview that market logic engenders.
Even some advocates of Law and Economics recognize that market
reasoning has limits. For instance, Neil Duxbury disparages resistance to
extending the market domain and insists that "[c]reeping commodifica-
tion... is not necessarily insidious commodification.,' ' Yet he concedes
that conclusions derived from economic analysis of some forms of human
activity "might be considered inappropriate because market reasoning is
able to provide only a limited or impoverished account of the particular
issue at stake."5 9 But, in contrast to the "boundless market" critics of Law
and Economics, Duxbury would place the burden of proof on those who
would restrict the application of market logic to show that the costs of
doing so would outweigh the benefits. 6
The second type of ideological critique objects to "reliance on eco-
nomic efficiency as the touchstone or guide to legal-economic policy
making.",6' Particularly where the conception of efficiency is "wealth
maximization," critics object that this is "not an adequate basis from
which to assess and make suggestions concerning the law.' '6' Rather than
maximizing social well-being and satisfaction in general, such critics in-
sist, the Law and Economics conception of value as wealth favors certain
groups, notably producers over consumers and the rich over the poor. 3
The ostensibly positivist welfare claim of Law and Economics turns out,
on closer inspection, to be "an ideological, and frequently objectionable"
position."
56. Id. at 270-71.
57. See id. at 270.
58. Duxbury, supra note 28, at 700.
59. Id. at 662.
60. Id. at 700.
6I. Mercuro, supra note 25, at 20. Mercuro attributes efficiency-fetishism specifically to what he
identifies as the "Chicago-Virginia" school of Law and Economics, from which his own favored neo-
institutionalism represents a departure. Id.
62. C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFt. 3, 47
(1975); see also Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUO. 191, 191-94 (i980); Ronald
M. Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 573-90 (i980). Kelman faults the "evaluative
term" in Law and Economics argument, whether expressed as "wealth maximization" or "efficiency,"
for its "ambiguity." Kelman, supra note 20, at 203.
63. Baker, supra note 62, at 9-32.
64. Id. at 3-4; see also Horwitz, supra note io, at 911 12.
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Representing a ligature between the foundational and the ideologi-
cal challenges to Law and Economics, a third strand of critique takes aim
at the movement's positivist claim. For positivist Law and Economics,
the mantle of science is what confers legitimacy and acceptability to its
analysis.6- To test whether the movement was true to its positivist aspira-
tion, Christopher Bruce examined contributions to a leading Law and
Economics journal over a seventeen year period.66 Contrary to the asser-
tion of positivism, Bruce found a substantial degree of normative argu-
ment, little rigorous testing of models, and little effort to contrast eco-
nomic with other models of law.67 He suggested that the infidelity of Law
68and Economics to its own positivist image would impede its acceptance.
Conversely, Donald McCloskey urges Law and Economics to dispense
entirely with the claim to be a positivist science, characterizing this asser-
tion as a "rhetorical practice" that intimidates non-economists and nar-
rows the scope of inquiry.
69
1I. LAW AND ECONOMICS IN
HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
While the theoretical foundations and ideological implications of
Law and Economics have received substantial critical attention, the exist-
ing literature does not offer an account of the historical sociology of the
movement. Indeed, few discussions, whether friendly or oppositional, se-
riously consider that Law and Economics has a history.7" Yet the signifi-
cance of the movement becomes fully apparent only by locating Law and
Economics against the historical-sociological background within which it
has emerged and spread, and to which it has helped give form and direc-
tion.
A. THE RISE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS
Scholars within the movement have employed the economic analysis
of supply and demand to account for the emergence and diffusion of Law
and Economics.7' The supply of economic arguments "refocused the re-
search interests of many legal scholars and even altered classroom dis-
65. See Goetz, supra note 14, at 248-50; Christopher J. Bruce, A Positive Analysis of Methodology
in the Law and Economics Literature, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 197 (1989).
66. Bruce, supra note 65, at 219-20. Bruce analyzed 126 articles from the first seventeen volumes
(1972-1988) of The Journal of Legal Studies, published at the University of Chicago.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752, 763-66
(8988).
7o. Recognition of the history of Law and Economics is typically limited to acknowledgment of
early examples of Law and Economics scholarship. See supra note Io and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Goetz, supra note 14, at 257-58; Mercuro, supra note 25, at 17.
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cussion."72 The diffusion of Law and Economics, as well as its failure to
penetrate into some areas or to gain more adherents, is a product of the
demand side.73 Yet these analyses offer no mechanism, beyond the "in-
herent 'imperialistic' nature of economics,"74 to explain why the supply of
economic argument should have come to market when it did. Nor do
they consider the extent to which supply, whatever its source, may create
its own demand.75
Other accounts of the rise of Law and Economics are more histori-
cal. One explanation notes "the almost simultaneous emergence" of Law
and Economics and Critical Legal Studies in the I97OS. 76 These two
movements, despite the common perception that they are opposing ten-
dencies with contrary political orientations, share roots in the legal realist
tradition.7  They arose when they did in response to the perceived failure
of "legal process" jurisprudence, which both Law and Economics and
Critical Legal Studies critique (though in different terms and with differ-
ent conclusions). 7 Some credit social events and cultural change as the
72. Goetz, supra note 14, at 257.
73. Id. at 257-58. For instance, Goetz attributes the relative paucity of Law and Economics analy-
sis in the area of constitutional law to a preference among legal scholars and jurists not to subject cher-
ished legal premises in that area to deconstructive economic analysis. Id.
74. Mercuro, supra note 25, at 17. To economic imperialists, "[p]ractically all forms of activity,
including love affairs and intellectual inquiry, are subject to the laws of supply and demand." Goetz,
supra note 14, at 257. The fact that these scholars employ the concept of supply and demand to explain
the diffusion of economic theory into law is itself a further illustration of the hegemony of economic
discourse.
75. The most famous version of the belief that supply creates its own demand is "Say's Law,"
named for the French political economist J.B. Say, who held that "there could not be a shortage of
purchasing power in the economy." JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT
WENT 218 (1975); ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 97 (ig6i). Say's Law, which
was hegemonic within economic theory from the early nineteenth until the early twentieth century,
"stands as the most distinguished example of the stability of economic ideas, including when they are
wrong." GALBRAITH, supra note 75, at 2i9.
In asserting that the demand for economic arguments, in law and more generally, is in part a
product of supply, I borrow not from Say but from sociological theory:
Preferences are formed not simply in response to the opportunities available, but by the na-
ture of the discourse through which people understand what choices are available, what it is
legitimate or socially appropriate to want, and according to the particular metric in which its
costs and benefits are to be evaluated.
ROGER FRIEDLAND & A.F. ROBERTSON, BEYOND THE MARKETPLACE: RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(1990).
76. Gary Minda, The Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies Movements in American
Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 87 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989); see also Fiss, supra note 6, at 14.
77. Minda, supra note 76, at 88-89, 95; Mercuro, supra note 25, at 17. Others who note the intel-
lectual link between Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies are Richard A. Posner, The De-
cline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, Ioo HARV. L. REV. 761, 768-69 (1987), and Mar-
tha L. Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79, 90-91 (1986).
78. Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1778-79 (1995); Minda, supra
note 76, at 99-too, 104; Fiss, supra note 6, at 2, 13-14: cf. Mercuro, supra note 25, at 17 (stating that
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driving force behind the upheaval in legal theory.79 Others point to fun-
damental changes in the nature of the economy during the same period.,
B. LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE TRANSITION TO LATE CAPITALISM
The timing and trajectory of the Law and Economics movement's
birth and development coincide with a set of economic, political and cul-
tural developments that numerous scholars have argued represent a fun-
damental social transformation on a global scale. ' The specific trends
Law and Economics "filled the void left by the legal realist movement," which had failed to fulfill its
own agenda); Posner, supra note 7, at 3 ("Economic analysis of law is generally considered the most
significant development in legal thought in the United States since legal realism petered out a half cen-
tury ago.").
79. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 6, at 14 (ascribing the rise of Law and Economics and Critical Legal
Studies to "the disintegration of public values" that defined the period of their emergence); Minda,
supra note 76, at 104-05 (declaring that legal process jurisprudence was "'oddly out of touch' with the
realities of social events following the Vietnam war and Watergate"); id. at 175o n.4 (noting the cul-
tural-social change associated with post-industrial or postmodern society).
8o. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 76, at 175o n.4, 1779-8o (maintaining that previous antitrust doc-
trine and policy was ill-adapted to an emergent postindustrial economy); William E. Kovacic, Reagan's
Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 199os, 6o FORDHAM L. REV. 49, ioo-oi (1991) (locating anti-
trust's embrace of Law and Economics in the context of economic globalization beginning in the
1970S).
81. A vast body of literature discusses and seeks to theorize the economic restructuring of the
neo-Liberal era, along with a set of social and cultural trends that this literature posits to be both
emergent from and engendering of that economic change. In the nomenclature of this literature, the
economic restructuring of the past three decades represents a transition to a new mode of capital ac-
cumulation variously termed "post-industrialism," "post-Fordism," "flexible accumulation," "late
capitalism," or "globalization"; the associated social and cultural forms are commonly identified under
the rubric of "postmodernity."
On economic restructuring, see generally BENNETT HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: THE CHANGING
LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE POWER IN THE AGE OF FLEXIBILITY (1994); WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT
RULES (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994); RICHARD BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPE-
RIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK,
LONDON, TOKYO (1991); DUAL CITY: RESTRUCTURING NEW YORK (John H. Mollenkopf & Manuel Cas-
tells eds., I991); DAVID HARVEY, THE URBAN EXPERIENCE (1989); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNITY (1989); MANUEL CASTELLS. THE INFORMATIONAL CITY (1989); JOYCE KOLKO, RESTRUC-
TURING THE WORLD ECONOMY (1988): BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN
(1988); SCOTT LASH & JOHN URRY, THE END OF ORGANIZED CAPITALISM (1987): CLAUS OFFE, DISORGAN-
IZED CAPITALISM (1985); MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE
(1984); ERNEST MANDEL, LATE CAPITALISM (1975).
On the politics and culture of postmodernity and globalization, see generally BOURDIEU, FIRING
BACK, supra note 52; BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTENCE, supra note 52; SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: SELECTED ESSAYS 1984-1998 (1998); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DIs-
APPEARS (1996); Bruce Pietrykowski, Consuming Culture: Postmodernism, Post-Fordism and Econom-
ics, RETHINKING MARXISM, Spring 1994, at 62; POST-FORDISM AND SOCIAL FORM: A MARXIST DEBATE ON
THE PosT-FORDIST STATE (Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway eds., 1994); George Steinmetz, Regula-
tion Theory, Post-Marxism and the New Social Movements, 36 CoMp. STUD. SoC'Y & HIST. 176 (1994);
Margit Meyer, Politics in the Post-Fordist City, 91(1) SOCIALIST REV. 105 (1991); JAMESON, supra note *;
Sharon Zukin, Socio-Spatial Prototypes of a New Organization of Consumption: The Role of Real Cul-
tural Capital, 24 SOCIOLOGY 37 (1990); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR (1989); Joachim
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that others have identified as the driving force behind the diffusion of
Law and Economics are encompassed within this broader transforma-
tion.s2 Yet previous explanations of the emergence of Law and Econom-
ics are inadequate to appreciate the movement's significance as a socio-
legal phenomenon. Instead, a critical socio-legal theory would locate
Law and Economics as a constitutive element in a restructuring regime of
capital accumulation and social regulation." Such a theory would simul-
taneously identify the socio-economic relations and interests that both
give impetus to the project of reconstituting capitalism and foster Law
and Economics as a theory of law in harmony with a neo-Liberal hege-
84monic project.
Like the late twentieth century, the late nineteenth century was a
period of fundamental economic and social transformation. In that pe-
riod, a new ideology of Liberalism gained ascendancy over social thought
and policy." Law, no less than other social institutions, came under Lib-
eralism's sway.8' Dominant explanations of the rise of Liberalism identifylaw as a tool that particular social actors wielded to reconstruct social in-
Hirsch, The Crisis of Fordism, Transformations of the "Keynesian" Security State, and New Social
Movements, to RES. Soc. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICT & CHANGE 43 (1988); FRED BLOCK ET AL., THE MEAN
SEASON: THE ATTACK ON WELFARE (1987); David Harvey, Flexible Accumulation through Urbanization:
Reflections on "Post-Modernism " in the American City, 90 ANTIPODE 260 (1987); THE CAPITALIST CITY:
GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND COMMUNITY POLITICS (Michael Peter Smith & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1987);
JEAN-FRAN;OISE LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massunni trans.,
Univ. of Minn. Press 1984); ANDRE GORZ, FAREWELL TO THE WORKING CLASS (Michael Sonenscher
trans., South End Press 1982); SHARON ZUKIN, LoFr LIVING: CULTURE AND CAPITAL IN URBAN CHANGE
(1982); DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973).
82. In the literature on late twentieth-century social transformation, phenomena and events such
as "the disintegration of public values," "the Vietnam War and Watergate," "post-industrialism," and
"globalization" receive considerable attention. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. How-
ever, this literature typically treats these matters as manifestations of underlying socio-economic
change, rather than as autonomous explanatory factors. See generally supra note 81.
83. See generally ALAIN LIPIETZ, MIRAGES AND MIRACLES: THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL FORDISM (David
Macey trans., 1987); MICHEL AGLIETA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION (David Fernbach trans.,
1979).
84. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS 12-13 (Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith
eds., 1971) (explaining the social-hegemonic function of intellectuals). Gramsci uses the term "hegem-
ony" to describe the domination of one class over others through a combination of political coercion
and ideological/moral consent. Id. at 58-59. The ideological dimension of hegemony entails the accep-
tance by the subordinate classes of the ideas and interests of the dominant class as "common sense,"
"natural" or "universal." For an examination of neo-liberalism as a Gramscian hegemonic project, see
Susan George, How to Win the War of Ideas: Lessons from the Gramscian Right, DISSENT, Summer
1997, at 47.
85. See generally Gordon, supra note 4.
86. Id. As Gordon notes, the hegemony of Liberal ideology was never total. Id. at 91. Nonethe-
less, it constituted "a collective consciousness, a way of organizing thinking about legal rights, that ar-
ticulate members of the late nineteenth-century American legal elite constructed and held in com-
mon." Id. at 9o-91.
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stitutions to suit their needs. 7 As an alternative to this instrumentalist
conception, legal historian Robert Gordon offers what he terms an
"'ideological' approach. 8 In this view, the work of legal elites brings le-
gal theory into play through legal practice: articulating clients' problems
and legal cases in terms of operative categories of legal discourse."' The
emergence of a new mode of legal theory and ideology is thus significant
not merely because of the instrumental force it might exert over legal
outcomes, but because it reorients consciousness among attorneys,
judges, clients, and other legal actors.' Moreover, legal ideology does not
exist in a distinct space bounded-off from the rest of society. In the pe-
riod that Gordon studies, "transformations in legal ideology were paral-
leled in all other spheres as well."9'
During the early 1970s, the global capitalist economy experienced a
profound crisis of accumulation.92 This crisis manifested itself not only
economically, but politically and culturally as well.93 Law and Economics,
which emerged and grew to prominence during this period, is a constitu-
tive element of the social and economic transformation emergent in the
wake of this crisis. The significance of Law and Economics in this sense is
not, however, merely its instrumental utility in serving the functional
needs of capital accumulation. Even more significant is the movement's
influence on the terms and categories of legal discourse. That is, Law and
Economics is most fully understood in socio-legal terms as constitutive of
neo-Liberal ideology in and through legal theory and practice. In this
sense, Law and Economics does serve to "legitimate and justify the
newly emergent forms of domination" of late capitalism." Yet it does so
not in a blunt instrumental way, but by contributing to the hegemony of
neo-Liberal ideology such that pro-corporate capitalist outcomes come
87. Id. at 70-71.
88. Id. at 71.
89. See id. at 7 1-72.
90. Id. at 72.
9i . Id.
92. See JAMES O'CONNOR, ACCUMULATION CRISIS (1984) (leading work on the concept of a crisis in
capital accumulations and its social and political effects): see also Mary Zey & Brande Camp, The
Transformation from Multidimensional Form to Corporate Groups of Subsidiaries in the 198os. Capital
Crisis Theory, 37 Soc. Q. 327 (1996); CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS THEORY: ACCUMULATION,
REGULATION AND SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING (Mark Gottdiener & Nicos Komninos eds., 1989); John
Bellamy Foster, Restructuring the World Economy in a Time of Lasting Crisis, MONTHLY REV., May
i989, at 46; Paul M. Sweezy, Marxian Value Theory and Crisis, MONTHLY REV., July-Aug. 1979, at I;
Andre Gunder Frank, World Crisis and Underdevelopment, INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST, Spring 1976, at
19; Erik Olin Wright, Alternative Perspectives in Marxist Theory of Accumulation and Crisis, INSUR-
GENT SOCIOLOGIST, Fall 1975, at 5.
93. See generally supra note 81.
94. Cf. Gordon, supra note 4, at 93.
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to appear universal, rather than particular, and as common sense, rather
than contested.95
On the cusp of the crisis of late twentieth-century capitalism, neo-
Liberal actors launched a tactical "war of position" to rearticulate the
terms of debate over economic and social policy.96 This project began to
take shape before the capitalist crisis was fully apparent; even while in-
terventionist hegemony was at its apex, a counter-hegemonic movement
was taking shape.' But it would not come into full flower for another
decade.' By the mid-i98os, the corporate investment had borne fruit, as
conservatives secured social hegemony and political power.'
Central to this hegemonic project is a reorientation of popular con-
ceptions of the economy. Neo-liberal discourse postulates the "free mar-
ket" ideal as a model not only for political economy but for social life in
general."° Law and Economics grows out of, and helps to form, this
95. Aron et al., supra note Io, at 37, explains corporate support for Law and Economics scholar-
ship in these terms:
Dressed in the neutral and objective garb that academic research enjoys, the scholarship fi-
nanced in this manner enjoys a stature and credibility that would not automatically attach to
similar arguments were they made by business partisans before courts or legislatures. Gen-
erous support of academic forays in law and economics thus is an integral and strategic
component of an overall campaign to secure a reshaped jurisprudence which accords
heightened protection to commercial and private property interests.
96. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword to JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CON-
SERVATIVE THINK-TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA, at ix (1996). Tushnet
borrows the concept of "war of position" from Gramsci. GRAMSCI, supra note 84, at 238-39. The term
refers to the development of "ideological stances" in preparation for a "war of maneuver" in which a
would-be hegemonic group moves to seize control over policy. See Tushnet, supra note 96, at ix.
97. See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 96, at 3 (noting the origins of the conservative project
in the s96os); Aron et al., supra note io, at 27 (associating "growing interest in 'law and economics"'
with "the mid-i97os business revolt against government regulation"). Discussing the ideological por-
tent of Coase's article, which launched the modern Law and Economics movement, Horwitz remarks
that its "boldest stroke ... was to deny the interventionist premises of welfare economics at just the
moment it had achieved hegemony." Horwitz, supra note so, at 907. The Coasean achievement, which
consisted of supplanting prior conceptions of social costs with a new common sense of "transaction
costs," exemplifies the activity that Gramsci identifies with the "war of position."
98. Stefancic and Delgado credit William Simon, a trustee of the John M. Olin Foundation, with
promoting corporate capital's full-court press to support conservative intellectuals. STEFANCIC &
DELGADO, supra note 96, at 3 (citing WILLIAM SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH (1978)).
99. Id. at 4. Stefancic and Delgado report on the success of the corporate-conservative hegemonic
project in a range of areas, including the backlash against affirmative action, the campus culture wars,
and tort reform. Id.; see also WILLIAM M. DUGGER, CORPORATE HEGEMONY (1989) (tracing the influence
of corporate capital in reshaping economic, political, cultural and social thought, institutions and prac-
tices).
IOO. Albert Hirschman expressly links the turn in economic discourse with the aftermath of the
accumulation crisis of the early 1970s:
[Keynesian] doctrine achieved intellectual and policy dominance in the early high-growth
postwar decades, but came to be contested in the seventies, with the unsettling experience
of rising inflation accompanied by economic stagnation and comparatively high unemploy-
ment. The counterdoctrines that became most successful within the economics profession
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hegemonic discourse. 1' In this sense, Law and Economics not only
"codif[ies] the biases and dominant ideology, the common sense, of the
historical period in which common law developed,"'0. but also crafts and
codifies the biases, dominant ideology, and common sense of a new his-
torical period as it unfolds." More than just the application of economic
theory to law, Law and Economics is a "form of political action" aimed
at creating "communities, shared references, commonsensical stories that
help shape and order an amorphous world."'" Law and Economics plays
go by the labels "monetarism" and particularly "new classical economics" or "rational ex-
pectations."
Hirschman, supra note 20, at 74. See also Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers, Big Business Deserts the
Democrats, NATION, July 5/12, 1986, at I.
Writing of the shift in antitrust doctrine in line with Law and Economics beginning in the late
i97os, Peritz recalls "the elevation of 'efficiency' to something akin to a neutral principle of govern-
ment, [and] the call to rally 'round the flag of managerial expertise and its sanitizing logic of market
economics." PERrrZ, supra note so, at 230. This "rhetoric of efficiency," Peritz explains, "meant getting
government off the backs of business." Id. Thus, the Reagan administration rode to power in 198o
"promis[ing]... [a] return to a robust economy founded in a regime of corporate control, subject only
to the discipline of 'the free market."' Id. at 266.
The logic of the market, private property, and deregulation extends beyond obviously economic
areas of law such as antitrust. A similar logic has guided the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence as well. Thus, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the Court justified restric-
tions on core political speech in a private shopping mall in terms of the owner's property rights and the
interests of consumerism. See PERITZ, supra note Io, at 248-49. Conversely, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), the Court struck down limits on campaign expenditures in a decision that equated
spending with speech, and property with liberty. See id. at 249-50. Peritz argues that the Court thus
"refused to allow Congress to regulate the effects of great wealth in political markets," and refused to
extend First Amendment protection against the effects of great wealth in property markets, just as it
refused to apply antitrust law to regulate the effects of great wealth in commercial markets. Id. at 250-
51.
ioi. Mercuro observes that, "the emergence of law and economics (particularly the Chicago-
Virginia reliance on private market institutions) evolved contemporaneously with an intellectual cli-
mate that was increasingly receptive to the view that markets are an effective form of social organiza-
tion." Mercuro, supra note 25, at I8. See also Duxbury, supra note so, at 302 (attributing the failure of
dissenting strains within Law and Economics to take hold to "the manner in which ... [the] concept
[of transaction costs] has been manipulated by proponents of law and economics in order to promote a
modern, 'sophisticated' version of laissez faire ideology"); STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 96, at
144-45 (identifying Law and Economics among conservative ideological initiatives in the academic
world).
102. Baker, supra note 62, at 48. Thus, for example, the influence of Coasean Law and Economics
lies in what it removes from controversy: the Coasean model assumes freedom of contract as the nor-
mal and natural condition, and places the burden of explanation and justification on those who would
regulate or intervene in the bargains of contracting individuals. Horwitz, supra note to, at 9o8.
IO3. Duxbury contrasts contemporary Law and Economics, which seeks to enshrine "the myth of a
free market," with realist-institutionalist economic jurisprudence in the I92Os, which sought to "ex-
plode" that myth. Duxbury, supra note io, at 308. In each instance, legal scholars and jurists deployed
economic discourse to reshape social consciousness and political-economic policy. Id.; see also
Gordon, supra note 4, at 95, 1O9 (noting demise of Liberal jurisprudence as it came under attack in the
early twentieth century).
1O4. Kelman, supra note 20, at 270.
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a twofold role in this project: the movement's scholarship advances
economistic discourse as the basis for framing and addressing social
problems, and judicial opinions adopting Law and Economics precepts
enforce economistic conceptions as law. °5
"To the extent that many businesses oppose many government ac-
tivities," Kelman observes, "there will always be an active market for po-
litically plausible, if academically shoddy, antiregulatory work."' 6 Law
and Economics has indeed been the beneficiary of "well-funded efforts
to promote it" both within the legal academy and to the judiciary."
Large corporations and corporate foundations have lavished millions of
dollars on Law and Economics centers, programs, professorships, and
fellowships at law schools throughout the Untied States.' Outside the
academy, corporate donors have funded numerous "efforts aimed at
shaping views toward modern capitalism,"" including studies supporting
1o5. See Horwitz, supra note io, at 907-08; Tushnet, supra note 96, at ix; PERrrz, supra note Io, at
230, 248-50, 262-64; Kovacic, supra note 80, at 83-84.
io6. Kelman, supra note 20, at 269.
Io7. Bogus, supra note 15, at 17.
io8. The largest contributors have been the John M. Olin Foundation, which has dispensed more
than $13 million in support of Law and Economics, and the foundations associated with Richard
Scaife, which have spent about $3 million. Id. at s8 n.62; see also Eric Alterman, The Troves of Aca-
deme, THE NATION, June 24, 1996, at 22; It Pays to Think Right, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 1992, at 1923; Law
Schools: Yale Notes, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1986, at 4; Joint Law Program Receives $354,7oo, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 199i, at J7.
Among the institutions boasting Law and Economics programs, chairs, or fellowships-all of
them supported by corporate foundations -are such elite law schools as Yale, Chicago, Harvard, Stan-
ford, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Cornell, Georgetown, and Berkeley, as well as the law schools at the
University of Miami, Emory, University of Kansas, and University of Southern California (the latter in
conjunction with Cal-Tech), and the business schools at MIT and Washington University. Eric Alter-
man, The Troves of Academe, THE NATION, June 24, 1996, at 22. One law school, George Mason Uni-
versity School of Law, which also receives substantial funding from Olin, Scaife, and other corporate
foundations, has elevated Law and Economics to a central organizing principle of its curriculum. See
Chris Klein, Law and Economics Finds its Niche, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at As; Bogus, supra note
15, at 18 n.62.
to9. Willard F. Mueller, The Anti-Antitrust Movement, 13(3) ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 59, 70
(1981). The Law and Economics Center at George Mason University has received as much as one-
third of its funding from corporations including Exxon, General Motors, Pfizer and Mobil. Bogus, su-
pra note 15, at 18 n.62. Yale's Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy has received funding from
the Aetna Life & Casualty Foundation to support its civil liability conferences for federal judges. Id. A
similar coterie of donors have funded the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environ-
ment, which runs seminars for federal judges on environmental economics and policy. Conferences in
July, GREENWIRE, June 17, 1994.
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deregulation,"0 tort reform,"' and reduced antitrust enforcement."' They
have also sponsored Law and Economics seminars for judges."3 Support-
ers of these programs defend them as "simply about making the law
more efficient and fair";"4 but critics aver that the corporate patrons of
io. Kelman, supra note 20, at 269. Kelman comments wryly on the irony of corporate support for
deregulation, in light of the Law and Economics argument that regulation is the product of cartelizing
behavior by producers seeking to extract surplus rents from consumers. Id.
i i. The Aetna and RJR-Nabisco foundations funded a five-year ALI study of the tort system that
resulted in a project to revise § 402A of the Restatement (2d) of Torts, dealing with products liability.
Bogus, supra note 15, at i8 n.62.
112. See Mueller, supra note Io9, at 71.
113. The most sustained effort to induce judges to imbibe Law and Economics teaching has come
from the Law and Economics Center, established by Law and Economics "founding father" Henry
Manne, and currently located at George Mason University. See Nan Aron et al., Judicial Seminars:
Economics, Academia, and Corporate Money in America, 25(2) AN-rrtuST L. & EcON. REV. 33 (1994);
Kovacic, supra note 80, at Ioo; Minda, supra note 76, at 1755 n.31; Bogus, supra note 15, at 18; Edward
R. Becker, The Uses of"Law and Economics" by Judges, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306 (1983); Mueller, supra
note io9, at 71. More than six hundred federal judges have attended the Center's judicial institutes
since its founding in 1976. George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Center, at
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/law/lawecon. At least one federal judge has urged the initiation of
similar programs for state judges. Becker, supra 128, at 309.
Similar programs for federal judges are or have been offered on the Law and Economics of civil
liability at Yale University, Aron et al., supra at 43; see also Bogus, supra note I5, at 18 n.62; and in
"free market" environmental economics and policy through the Foundation for Research on Econom-
ics and the Environment (FREE), among others. See In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 198 n.2 (2d Cir.
2001) (discussing judicial seminars-offered by the Law and Economics Center, FREE, the Manhattan
Institute, and Yale Law School); Who's Junketing the Judges, at http://www.tripsforjudges.org/
free.html (last visited Feb. i8, 2004); Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, at
http://www.free-eco.org/programs-judges.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
In the past, corporate sponsors directly bore much of the cost of immersing judges in Law and
Economics. Aron et al., supra at to. In the face of criticism, the Law and Economics Center has re-
placed direct corporate funding with grants from private foundations, many of which were themselves
"established with corporate money and remain wedded to their creators' staunch 'free market' ideolo-
gies." Id. (citing Olin and Bradley Foundations). One observer muses that "[t]he fact that corporations
fund 'Manne's initiative' to essentially persuade federal judges on the wisdom of minimal antitrust
enforcement policy is rather curious and troublesome." Minda, supra note 76, at 1755 n.31. Another
notes that some corporate donors are themselves parties in "cases before the very judges attending"
the seminars. Mueller, supra note Io9, at 71.
Corporate funding of such seminars has arisen as an issue in at least one federal court case. In
Aguinda, a group of Peruvian and Ecuadoran plaintiffs sued Texaco over environmental damage and
personal injuries allegedly caused by the company's operations in those countries. 241 F.3d at 197.
While the case was pending on an appeal from the trial judge's dismissal on procedural grounds, the
trial judge attended "an expense paid seminar on environmental issues" sponsored by FREE. Id. at
198-99. Upon remand, the plaintiffs moved for the trial judge to recuse himself on the ground that
Texaco had provided financial support to FREE, and that a former CEO of the company was a
speaker at the seminar. Id. at 199. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's denial of the recusal
motion, citing Texaco's "indirect and minor funding role and the lack of a showing that any aspect of
the seminar touched upon an issue material to the disposition of a claim or defense in the present liti-
gation." Id. at 198.
114. Jay Mathews, Business Tries to Shape Legal System, Report Says, WASH. PosT, May 19, 1993,
at F4 (quoting Nan Aron, executive director, Alliance for Justice).
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Law and Economics seek to use the movement to reshape the legal re-
gime in contours more facilitative of capital accumulation."5
An early product of the Law and Economics Center illustrates the
return that the movement's underwriters have realized on their invest-
ment. Responding to "strong, even strident, antibusiness and anticorpo-
rate sentiment," the Center published a volume of essays espousing
"free-market" analyses of various legal, social, and economic issues of
concern to large corporations."6 The volume was intended as a "quick
fix" to "anti-free-market attitudes."'"7 Contributors deployed Law and
Economics argument to rebuff calls for corporate social responsibility,
workers' rights legislation, insider trading controls, wage and price regu-
lation, stricter antitrust enforcement, and similar measures inimical to
unrestrained accumulation of corporate profits."'
The significance of this work is not merely instrumental. Specific
prescriptions may, of course, influence legal decisions, shape policy, and
decide cases in ways favorable to corporate interests. Even when it does
not achieve such direct instrumental impact, however, Law and Econom-
ics exerts its influence by recasting the terms of legal debate, reconceptu-
alizing socio-legal problems and goals, and reorienting the practice of
socio-legal actors whether or not they share the interests of corporate
capital.
Aided by the largesse of its sponsors, Law and Economics has as-
sumed its place as a "mainstream element of academic discourse" in the
contemporary law school."9 In the estimation of Yale Law School Dean
Anthony Kronman, Law and Economics is "the intellectual movement
that has had the greatest influence on American academic law in the past
quarter-century."'2. Whether measured by the number of law school pro-
fessors holding a Ph.D. in economics," ' the number of law school chairs,
fellowships, or programs in Law and Economics, 2  or the inclusion of
115. Id.
116. Foreword to THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES SOURCEBOOK, at
xiii-xv (M. Bruce Johnson ed., Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Center 1978).
117. Id. at xi, xiii.
iis. See generally THE ATACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note I I6.
119. See Kovacic, supra note 8o, at 99.
12o. Kronman, supra note 7, at I66; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law
During the 198os: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 227 (1990) (noting the "pervasive" influ-
ence of Law and Economics within the legal academy).
121. See Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 246 ("Most major law schools now have at least one profes-
sional economist on their faculty."); Fiss, supra note 6, at 2 ("[T]here is hardly a major law school that
does not have a full-time economist on its faculty."); Miller, supra note 12, at 26 (estimating 25 law
schools with Ph.D. economists as of I981).
122. Seesupra note 121.
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Law and Economics in the law school curriculum,'23 the movement's
prominence is evident. The precise scope, extent, loci, and patterns of its
influence are less clear.
C. THE JUDICIARY AS A SITE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS PRAXIS
Appellate judicial opinions are central to the Anglo-American sys-
tem of law. Judicial precedent is the touchstone for legal practice, legal
education, and legal scholarship. The significance of judicial opinions in
reshaping the legal landscape is both instrumental- i.e., deciding indi-
vidual cases-and ideological-i.e., guiding the way that legal actors
think and speak about the law. For Law and Economics as a hegemonic
project, the judiciary is therefore particularly crucial terrain. To the ex-
tent that judges adopt and reproduce Law and Economics argument in
their opinions, the movement gains ground in both the "war of position"
(i.e., transforming legal ideology) and the "war of maneuver" (i.e., win-
ning legal cases).
By most accounts, Law and Economics has not had the "pervasive"
influence within the judiciary that it has in the legal academy.' 4 Earlier in
the movement's history, one federal judge asserted that "in eleven years
as a district judge and almost one year as a judge of the Court of Ap-
peals, I have never heard a case in which law and economics analysis has
been applied..'.2 A more recent commentator has predicted that the lack
of penetration by Law and Economics into the courts is "unlikely to
change. '' ,26 Echoing the ideological critique of Law and Economics, the
lack of impact by the movement on the judiciary is attributed to the lim-
ited practical utility of economic analysis in judicial decision-making.'27
Yet the judiciary has not been entirely immune to the charms of Law
and Economics. In various ways, Law and Economics has gained a judi-
cial following and enlisted judges in its hegemonic project. Law and Eco-
nomics scholarship diffuses directly into judicial decision-making in two
ways. First, judges may read and adopt the arguments of the Law and
Economics literature.'2" Second, Law and Economics scholars themselves
123. See Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 246; Bogus, supra note 15, at 17.
124. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 12o, at 227; Bogus, supra note 15, at 17-18. Examining "The
Influence of Economics on Law," Posner contends that Law and Economic "is not merely an ivory-
towered enterprise," but has "influenced legal reform in an [sic] number of important areas." Posner,
supra note 7, at 3.
125. Becker, supra note 128, at 309.
126. Bogus, supra note I5, at i8. Bogus makes this prediction despite the "well-funded efforts to
promote [Law and Economics] to the judiciary." Id. at 17.
127. See id. at 29; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REV. 34, 47-48 (1992).
128. Cf. Kovacic, supra note 8o, at 83 (citing legal scholarship as an influence on judicial opinions
in antitrust cases); PERrrz, supra note 1o, at 282-84 (noting judicial adoption of "contestable market"
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may move from the academy to the bench."9 Indirect transmission may
also occur via other legal actors. Judicial Clerks who have been im-
mersed in Law and Economics while in law school may draft opinions
that cite to and follow the analysis of the Law and Economics litera-
ture.'30 Attorneys may introduce judges to Law and Economics by citing
theory from Law and Economics literature); Becker, supra note 113, at 310 (noting adoption by at
least some federal appellate courts of "Areeda-Turner marginal cost/average-variable-cost theory of
predatory pricing").
Educational seminars for judges represent a deliberate effort to introduce the judiciary to Law
and Economics and encourage its application in deciding cases. See supra note 113. Absent any direct
research, it is difficult to assess how effective these programs have been in bringing judges into the
Law and Economics fold. There is "at least some evidence that certain judges, after having attended
[Manne's seminar], have begun to apply the principles of Chicago neo-classical analysis in the resolu-
tion of antitrust cases." NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 360-6I (1995).
129. See Fiss, supra note 6, at 2 (crediting the appointment of Law and Economics scholars to the
federal judiciary as a crucial aspect of the movement's influence); Ulen, supra note 1O, at 202 (remark-
ing that Law and Economics "has begun to have a marked impact on the law as handed down by fed-
eral and state courts" as "distinguished practitioners of law and economics have ascended to the bench
and have used the tools of analysis from the field to decide cases before them"); Kornhauser, supra
note 3, at 246; Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that "a number of federal judges, including a Justice
of the Supreme Court (Stephen Breyer), are alumni of the law and economics movement"); Landes &
Posner, supra note 38, at 3 (citing the "fact that some judges appointed since 198o are practitioners or
former practitioners of economic analysis of law" as among the reasons that "judges are increasingly
receptive to economic arguments").
Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Douglas
Ginsberg and former Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and Judge Ralph Winter of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals are among the most prominent figures of the Law and Economics
movement to don judicial robes. See Minda, supra note 78, at 1755 n.3I: Kovacic, supra note 8o, at 124.
In addition to those judges, appointments to the federal bench by Presidents Reagan and Bush (I) in-
cluded numerous "staunch supporters of free market and anti-regulatory views." Minda, supra note
76, at 1755 n.31. By the end of his eight years in office, President Reagan had appointed "forty-seven
percent of all judges sitting on the federal district and court of appeals." Kovacic, supra note 8o, at 52.
In making his selections, Reagan sought "individuals who ... were more likely to doubt the efficacy of
government intervention in the affairs of business." Id. Kovacic credits President Reagan's "willing-
ness to entrust the decision of appellate cases to academic scholars who have the intellectual capital to
make a preferred agenda of ideas take root in the law," as the "shrewdest and most influential element
of [his] judicial selection strategy." Id. at 124.
130. See Harrison, supra note 36, at 104 ("Judicial clerks," trained in Law and Economics at law
school, "may influence the judges for whom they work and write.").
In 1995, nineteen percent of George Mason graduates obtained judicial clerkships. Klein, supra
note io8, at A26. The Federalist Society, which includes among its ranks many student initiates into
Law and Economics, is especially active in securing clerkships for its members. The Federalist Society
was established in 1982 at Yale University and spread to more than thirty law schools, including many
of elite rank, within the next three years. It is supported by many of the same corporate foundations
(notably Olin and Scaife) that have sponsored the Law and Economics movement. Glen Elsassen,
Federalist Society Grows into Conservative Bigshot, CHI. TRIBUNE, Jan. II, 1987, at CI; STEFANCIC &
DELGADO, supra note 96, at I o-I I. See generally The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy
Studies, at http://www.fed-soc.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
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to the literature in their briefs,'3 ' or employing Law and Economics
scholars as expert witnesses.132
The judiciary likewise fosters the diffusion of Law and Economics to
others. Legal scholars read and analyze judicial opinions, interpreting
them in terms of, or deriving from them, the categories of economic
analysis. Opinions expressly or implicitly adopting Law and Economics
principles may find their way into law school casebooks, thereby socializ-
ing law students into the discipline.'33 Attorneys, particularly when ap-
pearing before judges associated with the movement, may draft their
briefs and frame their arguments accordingly.'34
Il. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS AND ITS DIFFUSION
Empirical, and especially quantitative, research remains uncommon
within legal scholarship.'35 It is therefore not surprising that there has
been no comprehensive account of the scope and pattern of diffusion and
influence of Law and Economics. There have, however, been a few em-
131. Kovacic, supra note 8o, at loo.
132. Becker, supra note 113, at 306-o8; Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that "the use of econo-
mists as expert witnesses has become conventional in a range of important fields"). One consulting
firm, LEXECON, has provided expert witnesses on economic issues in numerous cases. E.g., Lexecon
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998); Mak v. Wocom Commodities Ltd.,
112 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1997); Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 1996):
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 26o, 265 n.Io (8th Cir. i995); Schwartz v. Sys. Software Assocs., 32
F.3d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1994): Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298, 350
(D.D.C. 200I), rev'd, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys.. ioo F.
Supp. 2d 885. 891 (N.D. I11. 2000). Among the principals in LEXECON is Daniel R. Fischel (President
and Chairman of LEXECON), a leading Law and Economics scholar. See Endo v. Albertine, 863 F.
Supp. 708, 723 n.21 (N.D. Il. 1994); see also Daniel R. Fischel Biography, at http://www.lexecon.com/
content.cfm?contentalias=bio&id=34&ugi=6 (last visited Feb. s8, 2004).
133. See Harrison, supra note 36, at 104 (speculating that "students who have had 'law and eco-
nomics' courses or who have been exposed to the 'law and economics' excerpts that pep-
per ... casebooks" may introduce Law and Economics argument into legal practice).
134. See Ulen, supra note io, at 202. Ulen mentions two other routes through which Law and Eco-
nomics reaches the legal profession: the naming of trained economists as law firm partners and "the
boom in litigation support provided by economic consultants." id. Anecdotal evidence suggests, how-
ever, that Law and Economics has not been especially influential among practicing attorneys. Judge
Harry Edwards cites one of his former law clerks who commented that Law and Economics is not of
much use in legal practice. Edwards, supra note 127. at 48. Landes and Posner note that, "it is only
since the early 197os that the [Law and Economics] movement has had significant visibility in legal
circles, and that it is too recent a period to have a profound effect [of Law and Economics] on the
practical side of the legal profession." Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 3.
135. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39
J. LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, With
Special Reference to Law and Economics 1, i (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law &
Economics, Working Paper No. 83, 2d Series, 1999), at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
WkngPprs_7 6-ioo/83.RAP.Citations.pdf?abstract-id=179655 (remarking on the "[s]carcity of quanti-
tative scholarship" in "legal research, including economic analysis of law").
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pirical investigations by legal scholars that bear on the issue. That work
offers a mixed picture of the movement's impact within the legal acad-
emy and the courtroom. In light of the incomplete and inconclusive na-
ture of previous research, further study, grounded in socio-legal theory,
remains necessary to elucidate the significance of the Law and Econom-
ics movement.
A. PREVIous EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Ernest Gellhorn and Glen Robinson assessed the permeation of Law
and Economics within law schools in the early I98os.' 36 The authors
noted a marked increase in the number of law school faculty members
holding Ph.D.s in economics.'37 However, after surveying the inclusion of
Law and Economics in widely used course books in four legal fields, the
authors concluded that the movement had "scarcely penetrated legal
education at all.
''038
Robert Ellickson examined the diffusion of Law and Economics
within law schools, across legal specialties, and into other university de-
partments.' 39 He showed that Law and Economics was established within
elite law schools by 197o and spread rapidly to other law schools across
areas of law over the next few years.'4° But by the mid-i98os, Ellickson
contended, the diffusion of Law and Economics had stalled.'4 To support
his claim, Ellickson examined the proportion of articles making Law and
Economics arguments among all contributions to four elite law reviews.'42
He found that this figure increased significantly between i966 and 1970,
but reached a plateau thereafter.'4 3 Following up on the Gellhorn and
Robinson study, Ellickson found that law school course books gave no
greater space to Law and Economics in the late I98os then they had at
the start of the decade.'" Similarly, Ellickson noted a decrease in the fre-
quency of publications in a series of Law and Economics "readers" by a
136. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education, 33
J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1983).
137. Id. at 265 n.76 (listing law school faculties with at least one Ph.D. economist).
138. Id. at 254-65.
139. Ellickson, supra note 48, at 24-32.
140. Id. at 24, 26-27.
141. Id. at 24, 28-32.
142. The journals that Ellickson surveyed were the Harvard, Stanford, and University of Chicago
Law Review(s) and the Yale Law Journal. Id. at 28.
143. Id. Specifically, Ellickson found that Law and Economics accounted for between six and
seven percent of all articles in i96o-I96i and 1965-1966, increased to twenty-eight percent in 1970-
i97i, and subsequently fluctuated between fourteen and thirty-three percent in 1975-1976, i980-i98I,
and 1985-1986. Id.
i44. Id. at 30. The most notable change that Ellickson found was the addition of material critical of
Law and Economics in one leading casebook. Id.
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leading legal publisher.'45 Ellickson also compared the attendance at pro-
grams sponsored by the Law and Economics section of the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) at its annual conventions with atten-
dance at programs sponsored by other interdisciplinary sections. While
the sections on Legal History, Law & Humanities, and Law & Religion
attracted an average of about five percent of convention attendees at
their programs, Law and Economics attracted just slightly more than
three percent of the same audience.' 46 Finally, Ellickson measured the
professionalization of Law and Economics, as indicated by the increased
dominance of Ph.D. economists among contributors to leading Law and
Economics journals.'47 On the basis of these findings, Ellickson con-
cluded that Law and Economics had become "a technical sideshow"
rather than a dominant "intellectual tide" within law schools.'48
Landes and Posner examined the frequency of citation to Law and
Economics scholarship in both scholarly literature (both in law and in
other disciplines) and appellate judicial opinions.'49 First, they measured
citations in law and social science journals to the work of three selected
groups of Law and Economics scholars.'50 They found that citations to
that work increased during the period from 1976 to 199o, both in abso-
lute terms'5' and relative to "doctrinal"'52 and "political theory"'53 schol-
145. Id. at 31. According to Ellickson, most of the titles in the Little, Brown series first appeared
between 1975 and 198o and did not subsequently appear in new editions. Id.
146. Id. Ellickson's figures represent average attendance at each section's programs at AALS con-
ventions between 1986 and 1989. Id.
147. Id. at 32. Ellickson measured the change in the percentage of authors holding a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics among contributors to The Journal of Law and Economics, The Journal of Legal Studies, and
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. He counted articles appearing during two periods:
1972-1975 (the first four years of publication of The Journal of Legal Studies) for the first two journals,
and 1985-1988 (the first four years of publication for The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organiza-
tion) for all three journals. The percentage of contributors who were law school faculty members with
a Ph.D. in economics more than doubled between the two periods (from eight to nineteen percent),
while the percentage of law faculty members lacking such a degree fell by more than one-third (from
nineteen to twelve percent). Id. at 33 tbl.2.
148. Id. at 32. Ellickson also suggested that Law and Economics work was being diverted from law
schools to other university departments, notably business schools. Id. at 33-34.
149. Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 6.
15o. Using the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), which tracks citations in articles appearing in
some 1400 periodicals, including about 1oo law journals, Landes and Posner counted citations to work
by (i) thirteen non-lawyer economists on the faculty of fifteen leading law schools; (2) ten law profes-
sors at the same leading law schools who also have doctoral degrees in economics; and (3) four "foun-
ders of law and economics" (Calabresi, Coase, Manne, and Posner). Id. at 7-9.
I5I. Id. at lO-3O.
152. Id. at 30-35.
153. Id. at 35-37.
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ars.'54 They also measured citations to articles appearing in two leading
Law and Economics journals: Journal of Law and Economics and Jour-
nal of Legal Studies.'5  Citations to those journals also increased, both in
absolute terms,5 6 and relative to citations to other interdisciplinary law
journals, 5' and fifteen leading law reviews."" Finally, they classified arti-
cles in five leading law reviews5 5 by analytical approach,'6 and measured
citations to those articles in law reviews and judicial opinions. 6' The
number of citations to "economics" articles was greater than for articles
in any other category except for "doctrinal. ' ' 162 On the basis of these vari-
ous measures, Landes and Posner conclude that Law and Economics has
had a greater impact relative to other approaches to legal scholarship
since the mid-I970s.' The analysis sheds light on "the role of specialized
journals in the propagation of a school of thought."' 64
154. The rate of increase was even greater for "critical legal studies" and "feminist" scholars. Id. at
37-38. Through various statistical manipulations, Landes and Posner seek to mitigate this finding. See
id. at 38-41.
155. Id. at 41-42. In addition to examining the absolute number of citations to each journal, Lan-
des and Posner also examined the "impact factor" (i.e., "the number of times the average article in a
given journal is cited"). Id. at 43. The "impact factor" controls for differences in the longevity of, or
the number of articles published by, the journals surveyed. Id.
156. Id. at 43-46.
157. Id. at 46-47. Both the absolute number of citations and the "impact factors" were greater for
the Law and Economics journals as compared to the other interdisciplinary journals. Id.
i58. Id. at 48-49.
159. The sample included the 1975, I98O, 1985, and 1988 volumes of the law reviews published by
Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale law schools. Id. at 50.
16o. The categories were "Doctrinal," "Economics," "Philosophy," "CLS," "Feminism" "His-
tory," and "Other" (including "comparative law, empirical studies not otherwise classifiable, law and
political science, and legal sociology"). Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 5o-51. The data that Landes and Posner report show an interesting discrepancy to
which they do not call attention. Among the citing law reviews, the rate of citations per article for
"economics" (23.57), while nearly as great as for "doctrinal" (26.71) and greater than for "history"
(16.18), was less than the citation rate for "philosophy" (36.76), "CLS" (41.69), and "feminism" (30.0).
See id. at 5o tbl.18. In contrast, among the citing judicial opinions, the rate of citations per article was
greater for "economics" (3.47), than for "philosophy" (2.35), "CLS" (o.62), "feminism" (o.6o), "his-
tory" (.71), or "other" (2.J6), though not as great as for "doctrinal" (4.63). See id. These data suggest
that Law and Economics may have made the greatest inroads into the judiciary among contemporary
non-doctrinal approaches to legal analysis, while legal scholars have shown relatively greater interest
in other non-traditional approaches. Partisans of Law and Economics would no doubt attribute this
discrepancy to differences in the operation of market forces in the judicial versus the academic realm.
A skeptic might note that CLS, feminism, and other alternative approaches have not benefited from
well-funded and organized efforts to market their wares to judges, as has Law and Economics.
163. Id. at 51-52.
164. Id. at 7.
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Two studies shed light on the extent to which Law and Economics
has penetrated into the courtroom to influence judicial decision-making.
These provide a mixed picture and suggest that the judicial impact of
Law and Economics may vary across areas of law. Surveying judicial
opinions in contract cases, Jeffrey Harrison found scant evidence of Law
and Economics influence.' 6' Of fifty-eight books and articles that Harri-
son analyzed on the Law and Economics of contract, half were never
cited in any state or federal opinion.' 66 Moreover, where judges did cite to
Law and Economics literature, they often did so without any detailed
discussion or comment. '67 In contrast, William Kovacic's analysis of judi-
cial opinions in antitrust cases in the I98os suggests a greater influence of
Law and Economics in that field."6 The opinions of Reagan-appointed
judges in antitrust cases were markedly conservative, embodying policy
views grounded in the theories of the Chicago School Law and Econom-
ics.'
69
165. Harrison. supra note 36, at 75-76. The opinions that Harrison examined included concur-
rences and dissents. Id. at 8o.
166. Id. at 80.
167. Id. Harrison identified seventy-seven citations to the works he analyzed, with thirty-five of
these consisting of a "mere notation." Id. In nineteen cases, in which a total of nine works were cited.
Harrison concluded that the cited work had influenced the opinion. Id. In an additional twenty-three
cases, Harrison believed that the judge "recognized the 'law and economics' argument," even though
the argument was not clearly influential on the outcome. Id. In federal appellate opinions, Harrison
found thirty-three citations, nearly half of them by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 8o.
168. See generally Kovacic, supra note 8o, at 49.
169. Id. at 55-56, 82, 83 n.145. While Kovacic found a conservative trend among Carter-appointees
as well, the trend was more pronounced among Reagan-appointees. Id. at 82. Kovacic observed, how-
ever, that even many conservative Reagan-appointees declined to follow Law and Economics precepts
where these contradicted established precedent. Id. at I8-o9.
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B. JUDICIAL CITATIONS TO LAW AND ECONOMICS LITERATURE AS A
MEASURE OF INFLUENCE
As a provisional examination of the diffusion of Law and Economics
through the judiciary, I collected data on the frequency of judicial cita-
tions to Law and Economics scholarship during the period of the con-
temporary Law and Economics movement (1965 to the present). Cita-
tions to Law and Economics scholarship are one way that judges may
incorporate Law and Economics into their opinions.170 As such, the fre-
quency of such citations provides a measure of the ideological influence
of Law and Economics, regardless of whether or not there is any instru-
mental link between citations to Law and Economics literature and deci-
sions reached in the citing opinions.
To examine the diffusion of Law and Economics into judicial deci-
sion-making, I searched for citations in federal appellate court opinions172
to five leading Law and Economics journals: Journal of Law & Econom-
ics, Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization,
International Review of Law and Economics, and Research in Law and
Economics.
73
170. See Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (identifying judicial citation to economic concepts and scholar-
ship as measure of influence of Law and Economics); Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 6-7 (explain-
ing use of citation analysis as measure of influence). Citation analysis is a particularly appropriate
methodology in a discipline as "preoccupied with citation" as the law. See id. at 52; Posner, supra note
135, at 2 (noting that "both adjudication, a central practical activity of the legal system, and legal re-
search are citation-heavy activities"). More specifically, because judicial opinions cite to other work
for its "authority" value, citations by judges to Law and Economics scholarship is an indication that
such work is seen as, at least in some sense, "authoritative." See id. at 6-7; see also Fred R. Shapiro,
The Most-Cited Articles From The Yale Law Journal, 1oo YALE L.J. I449 (discussing citation data as
measure of influence of legal scholarship).
171. Law and Economics might influence judicial opinions in at least two ways. Instrumentally,
economic analysis might produce different outcomes in particular cases and lead to the adoption of
different legal rules more generally. Ideologically, judges might express their opinions in terms of eco-
nomic analysis, without any direct impact on outcomes or rules, but enhancing the hegemony of eco-
nomic reasoning. See Harrison, supra note 36, at 79 (distinguishing outcome-determinative from
methodological impact of Law and Economics).
172. I searched all cases from 196o through 2002 in LEXIS (GENFED; USAPP file). Table i re-
ports the number of cases in which there is at least one citation to any of the selected journals. I in-
cluded all opinions (i.e., those for the court, as well as concurring and dissenting opinions) in my
search, but count a case only once, regardless of how many citations to the selected journals there are
or how many opinions in that case cite to those journals. Because of its specialized docket, I omit the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals from my tabulations and analysis.
173. My selection of journals follows Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 42.
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TABLE I
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS CITATIONS TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS JOURNALS, 1968-2002
1ST 2D 3D  4- 5TH 6TH 7TH 8TH 9TH IOTHJ IlTH D.C. TOTAL
2002 2 2 I 5
2001 I 4 1 6
2000 I 2 1 1 1 6
1999 I 2 3
1998 2 I 4 I 8
1997 1 4 I 6
1996 5 1 6
1995 2 1 4 i 1 9
1994 I I
1993 2 5 7
1992 I I 5 1 i 9
1991 I 2 3 6
I990 I 1 2 2 6
1989 I 2 1 I 5
1988 1 1 I 4 1 8
1987 I I 7 2 2 13
1986 I 9 I II
1985 I 2 I 1 5 10
1984 1 2 I I 5
1983 2 4 1 1 8
1982 3 I 4
198I 2 1 I 2 6
1980 1 2 3
1979 1 1 2
1978 1 
1977 I I 2 4
1976 1 1
1975 0







TOTAL 6 I 13 2 9 2 178 2 171 I] 2 1 261 168
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No federal appellate opinion cited to any of the journals in my
search prior to 1968. During the ensuing dozen years, the volume of cita-
tion remains quite small; prior to I98I, the annual number of citations
never exceed four, and seldom exceeded one. In 1981, there is a small but
noticeable jump, with the number of citations doubling from three to six
and increasing for seven years thereafter. Following a peak of thirteen
citations in 1987, the number of citations has dropped back into the up-
per single-digits in most years. 74 These data are consistent with the hy-
pothesis of a constitutive relation between Law and Economics and a
neo-Liberal hegemonic project of late capitalism in the 197os and i98os.
Specifically, they indicate that judicial citation to Law and Economics
scholarship did increase noticeably (if not overwhelmingly) once the or-
ganized efforts at promoting the movement had taken steam.'
71
Of i68 total citations between 1968 and 2002, seventy-eight are from
Seventh Circuit cases. 76 Moreover, that court's citations account for most
of the increase in total annual citations since i98i. In no circuit other
than the Seventh does the number of citations ever exceed three in a
year.' 77 Yet the Seventh Circuit never cited to these Law and Economics
journals prior to 1982. Of the seventy-eight Seventh Circuit cases in Ta-
ble i, Judges Posner and Easterbrook are responsible for sixty-eight of
the citing opinions. 78 Thus, the data supports the popular view that
Judges Posner and Easterbrook are the leading judicial adherents of Law
and Economics. 
7 9
In light of the status of Ronald Coase's article, The Problem of So-
cial Cost'80 as a catalyst for the Law and Economics movement, I
searched for all federal appellate cases citing to that article through to
174. 1994 and 1999 stands out with only one and three citations respectively.
175. As Landes and Posner note, "it is evident that judges (or their law clerks) don't cite many
articles of any type; perhaps the reason is that they have so many cases to cite!" Landes & Posner, su-
pra note 38, at 50-51.
176. This finding accords with Harrison's earlier findings for citations to Law and Economics
scholarship in contracts cases. See Harrison, supra note 36, at 8o.
177. Though the annual numbers are very small, the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits (in ascending
order) show some propensity to cite to Law and Economics journals. At the other extreme, the
Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have each cited to those journals only two times, and the Tenth
Circuit has done so only once, in thirty-five years.
178. Judge Posner (who joined the court in 1981) authored fifty-five of the citing opinions; Judge
Easterbrook (who joined the court in 1985) authored thirteen.
179. Judge Robert Bork and Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit have also been singled
out for their association with Law and Economics. See Minda, supra note 76, at 1755 n.31; Kovacic,
supra note 8o, at 124. Yet neither is responsible for a large share of that court's citations to Law and
Economics journals. Likewise, on the Ninth and Third Circuits, which have the next greatest frequen-
cies of citation, no single judge predominates among the authors of citing opinions.
18o. 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (196o).
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the end of 2002.8 ' The first such citation was in a 1968 case in the Second
Circuit. s2 However, that debut citation hardly signaled an embrace of
Coase's theorem. Adverting to the "theoretical" possibility of Coasean
bargaining between shipowners and drydock owners over the allocation
of risks between them, the court opined that "this would seem unlikely to
occur in real life."'83 Not until six years later did a court cite Coase ap-
provingly for his proposition regarding the appropriate allocation of tort
costs.' Another six years lapsed before a subsequent citation to Coase's
article. 5 Altogether, federal Court of Appeals judges have cited to
Coase's article in twenty-six cases between 1968 and 2002."86 Of these,
more than half have been in the Seventh Circuit.
Overall, these data do not contradict the conclusion of previous
commentators that the explicit influence of Law and Economics on judi-
cial practice has been modest. The fact that so sizeable a proportion of
citations to Law and Economics journals are in opinions authored by two
judges who are prominent as Law and Economics scholars suggests that
appointment of those individuals to the bench is a particularly significant
route of diffusion for Law and Economics. Yet, the colleagues of Judges
Posner and Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have
been only slightly more likely than judges in other circuits to cite to Law
181. See infra note I86.
182. Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 1968).
183. Id.
184. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974). Along with Coase, the court also
cited GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1g7o). Id.
185. Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. i98o). Once again, the court paired Coase with
Calabresi, this time citing the latter's article, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability
Rules, 1I J.L. & Econ. 67 (1968). Nelson, 639 F.2d at 478 n.Io.
186. U.S. Court of Appeals' opinions citing to R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
Econ. 1 (196o), include: Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Teamsters Local 734
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, 196 F.3 d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 1999); Leisnoi, Inc. v. Strat-
man, 154 F.3d io62, lo7i (9th Cir. 1998); Chrysler Corp. v. Kolosso Auto Sales, 148 F.3d 892, 894 (7th
Cir. 1998); Avitia v. Metro. Club, 49 F-3d 1219, 1232 (7th Cir. I995); Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.,
993 F.2d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 1993); Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 88o, 888 (7th Cir.
1993); Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir 1992); Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. I99I); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 861 F.2d 155, i58 (7th Cir 1988); NBC v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1296 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Sec'y of Labor, United States Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 n.6 (7 th Cir.
1987); Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 742 (7th Cir. 1987); Sarnoff v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, lO83 (7th Cir. 1986); McMunn v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 791 F.2d 88,
92 (7th Cir. 1986); Madison Consulting Grp. v. South Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193, 121o n.7 (7th Cir. 1985);
District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, IO79 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Flagstaff v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. R. Co., 719 F.2d 322,323 (9th Cir. 1983); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 7o8 F.2d 1263,
1268 (7th Cir. 1983); Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 770 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983); Webster v. Houston,
689 F.2d 1220, 1237 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1029
(7th Cir. 1982); Powers v. United States Postal Serv., 671 F.2d 1041, 1O44 (7th Cir. 1982); Nelson, 639
F.2d at 478 n.lo; Union Oil Co., 5O1 F.2d at 569; Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 398 F.2d at 171 n.7.
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and Economics journals.' Thus, it is not at all clear that the presence of
such judges on a court substantially increases the propensity of their col-
leagues to adopt Law and Economics in their own opinions.
The body of Law and Economics literature is, of course, greater than
that contained in the journals included in this analysis. Future investiga-
tion might examine citations to a broader body of literature, to obtain a
more comprehensive picture of the extent and pattern of explicit judicial
reliance on Law and Economics scholarship.' 88 It would also be helpful to
compare citations to journals and leading scholars representing other ap-
proaches to legal analysis (i.e., Critical Legal Studies, Socio-Legal Stud-
ies, etc.), to be able to gauge the relative influence of Law and Econom-
ics.'
89
Explicit citation to Law and Economics literature may not be the
only measure of the movement's diffusion through the judiciary, how-
ever. A more interesting sign of the movement's influence would be
opinions in which judges adopt the discourse and categories of Law and
Economics argument without expressly citing to the scholarly litera-
ture.' 9 To the extent that the discourse and reasoning of Law and Eco-
nomics attains the status of common sense, reasonable ways of deciding
cases, without need of supporting authority, 9' Law and Economics may
truly be said to be hegemonic. Future research-involving close reading
of a large number of judicial opinions to identify those in which Law and
Economics is implicit as well as explicit-would provide an important
187. The Seventh Circuit colleagues of Judges Posner and Easterbrook have been responsible for
only eight citing opinions since I98I, fewer than the members of the Third Circuit (ten citing opin-
ions), Ninth Circuit (eleven citing opinions) and D.C. Circuit (nineteen citing opinions) during the
same period.
188. Cf. Harrison, supra note 36, at so (using list of fifty-eight selected books and articles to assess
influence of Law and Economics in contract cases).
189. See Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 30-41, 46-47,50-51.
19o. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 170, at 1453 ("The most interesting legacy of [influential works of le-
gal scholarship] may well be found in subsequent work which does not cite them."). Shapiro observes
that,
[i]mpact on terminology and discourse is a form of influence which may not always be re-
flected in counts of explicit citations, and thus resembles the phenomenon of "obliteration"
identified by Robert K. Merton and other sociologists of science. The work of some think-
ers is so influential that it is integrated into the common body of knowledge to the point
where scholars no longer feel they have to cite it explicitly.
Id. (citing ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 27-28, 35-38 (1968)). Opinions
in which the court takes (express or implicit) judicial notice of economic reasoning would represent a
similar type of influence at play: integrating economic ideology into the common law to the point that
it requires no citation to scholarly authority.
191. The argumentum ad verecundiem (i.e., argument from authority) is characteristic of legal
rhetoric. McCloskey, supra note 69, at 755. In contrast, economic rhetoric gives no weight to the au-
thority behind a proposition. Id. The emulation in legal argument of the rhetorical style, as well as of
the analytical mode, of economics would further reflect the hegemony of economic ideology.
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test of the movement's significance as a constitutive element in and of
neo-Liberalism. Along with citations to Law and Economics literature,
future investigation might also look at citations to precedent opinions
that have relied on that literature, to see whether they adopt or comment
on the Law and Economics principles incorporated into those precedent
opinions. Once a body of Law and Economics opinions has been com-
piled, these may be analyzed and classified by subject area. The relative
frequency with which opinions in different areas of law deploy Law and
Economics argument will further map the reach of the movement.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested that the Law and Economics movement is best un-
derstood as an aspect of a neo-Liberal hegemonic project to restructure
economic and social relations in the transition to a new regime of capital
accumulation. A preliminary examination of the extent to which Federal
appellate judges have cited to Law and Economics scholarship during the
past thirty years, while insufficient to offer strong empirical support for
the argument I have presented, does suggest that further inquiry in this
direction is worthwhile.
I have already indicated some respects in which further investigation
might augment and refine the data and analysis regarding judicial cita-
tion to Law and Economics scholarship. In addition, further areas for
socio-legal inquiry into Law and Economics remain unexplored. Within
the formal "legal system" itself, future research might examine the con-
stitutive play of Law and Economics in professional legal practice, 92 ex-
ploring whether and how attorneys incorporate or draw upon Law and
Economics in developing legal theories, preparing and presenting evi-
dence, and framing legal arguments; how legal practice (re)produces Law
and Economics argument, and how economic ideology constitutes and is
diffused through lawyer-client interactions. In addition, the socio-legal
understanding of "law" as embedded and enmeshed in "society" suggests
inquiry into the diffusion of Law and Economics through, and its consti-
tution of, multiple legalities above, below, and beyond the formal "legal
system" itself.
93
192. Cf. Christine B. Harrington, Outlining a Theory of Legal Practice, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMOD-
ERN WORLD 49-51 (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994) (arguing that critical socio-
legal accounts should be attentive to professional legal practice in the constitution of legal ideology);
Gordon, supra note 4 (developing an ideological account of legal practitioners in the constitution on
Liberal ideology).
193. Cf. Boaventura deSousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading, 14 J.L. & Soc'Y 279 (5987); Brig-
ham, supra note I, at 303; MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 78-I08 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., Pantheon Books 198o
(1972)).
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A fuller investigation into Law and Economics along these lines
would contribute to socio-legal scholarship in two respects. First, such re-
search would enrich the understanding of a movement that has been
highly visible in legal circles for the past two decades or more, and pro-
vide an analysis of that movement that would better enable a decisive cri-
tique of its claims. Second, such work would add to the broader socio-
legal understanding of law as a constitutive element of society, both
agent and object of social structure and change.
